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Divided Nation: The North-South Cleavage
in Italian Tax Compliance
John D’Attoma, European University Institute
It is well known that tax compliance is low in Italy, and lower in the South than in the
North. Many scholars have examined Italian taxpayer behavior, mainly using experiments
and surveys. However, little attention has been given to the historical circumstances that
have shaped divergent taxpayer behavior by Northern and Southern Italians. This article
uses historical data from Italian unification through the Second Republic to assess the ef-
fects of Italy’s major formal institutions (the church, state, and political parties) and infor-
mal institutions (clientelism) on Italian tax behavior. It argues that nineteenth-century uni-
fication had significant repercussions on the two most important institutions in Italy—the
Catholic Church and the state—and hence led to two different kinds of clientelism. Since
Southern clientelism favored private interests and Northern clientelism led to the construc-
tion of public institutions, this created two different tax compliance environments.
Keywords: comparative political economy, tax compliance, Italy, tax morale, historical
institutionalismFormer Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi once famously claimed thatthe “evasion of high taxes was a God-given right.”1 Tax evasion costs the Ital-
ian state an estimated 120 billion euros each year in lost revenue,2 but it varies
greatly between the North and South of Italy. In the Northern regions from Lom-
bardy to Lazio, evasion of the regional tax on production (Imposta Regionale sulle
Attivita Produttive, or IRAP) ranges from about 13% to 54%; in the South (the
Mezzogiorno), covering Molise to Sicily, it ranges from about 54% to 94% (seeI would like to thank Professors Sven Steinmo, Fred Pampel, Clara Volintiru, David Bruner,
Kenneth Thomas, Fred Cocozzelli, David Kimball, Dave Robertson, and Stephen Brooker for
their helpful comments. I also thank the four anonymous referees and the editors at Polity
for the valuable feedback. This article draws on the “Willing to Pay” project funded by the Eu-
ropean Research Council Agreement no. 295675.
1. Jabeen Bhatti et al., “Tax Evaders in Greece, Spain, and Italy Better Beware,” USA Today,
January 31, 2012, at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-01-29/tax-evaders
-greece-spain-italy/52822942/1.
2. Alessandro Santoro, L’Evasione Fiscale (Bologna, Italy: Mulino, 2010).
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70 | Divided NationFigure 1). Underground labor as a percentage of regular work, a common indi-
cator for tax evasion, averaged an estimated 9.8% in in the Northern and Central
regions of Italy in 2004 but reached 18.8% in the South.3,
One explanation for these disparities, promoted by Robert Putnam and others,
depicts Southern Italians as less endowed with civic virtue and social capital,
which is reflected in their lower levels of economic development and governmentFigure 1. Intensity of Evasion of the Regional Production Tax (IRAP) by Region, 1998–2002
Source: ISTAT (see note 3 in text above); Santoro, L’Evasione Fiscale (see note 2 in text above).3. Bruno Chiarini and Elisabetta Marzano, “Structural and Cyclical Patterns of Under-
ground Labour Input in Italy From 1980 to 2004,” SSRN Electronic Journal (2007): 1–9. The
method used by the Italian National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) to estimate underground
labor is well documented in the OECD Handbook, “Measuring the Non-Observed Economy,”
2002, at https://www.oecd.org/std/na/1963116.pdf. It has been argued that Central Italy, made
up of Umbria, Toscany, Lazio, Marche, and Emilia Romagna, should be considered a distinct
region known as the Center. However, more often the North-South cleavage is defined at
Rome’s southern border. In the rest of the article, I thus consider the central regions, which
are some of the most developed regions in Italy, to be part of the North.
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John D’Attoma | 71performance.4 Here civic virtue is defined as high civic awareness and a shared
consensus regarding the legitimacy of political institutions and public policy, to-
gether with political competence and trust.5 Social capital refers to features of so-
cial life, such as networks and trust, that facilitate civic participation.6
This line of research typically links development to the cultural underpin-
nings of society. A centuries-old stereotype would have us believe that the Italian
“character is faulty, and that this faultiness even explains much of the social and
political problems of their country today.”7 Indeed, Europeans perceive Italians
as the least trustworthy of Western European nations.8 First Edward Banfield,
followed by Robert Putnam and his colleagues, suggested that Southern Italy,
in particular, is a region characterized by “amoral familism.” Such societies, tied
by “bonding” social capital, “emphasize family relations to the exclusion of all4. Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Edward Banfield,
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1967); Fabio Sabatini, “Social
Capital, Public Spending, and the Quality of Economic Development,” SSRN Electronic Journal
(2006): 1–45; Fabio Sabatini, “The Role of Social Capital in Economic Development: Investigat-
ing the Causal Nexus Through Structural Equations Models,” SSRN Electronic Journal (2005):
1–27; Maria Bigoni et al., “Amoral Familism, Social Capital, or Trust? the Behavioural Founda-
tions of the Italian North-South Divide,” The Economic Journal (2015): 1–24; Roberto Cartocci,
“L’Unificazione Fallita: il Sud e il Capitale Sociale,” Vita e Pensiero 6 (2006): 105–13.
Bordandini and Cartocci have confirmed the divergence in social capital between Northern
and Southern Italy using a variety of indicators, including electoral participation, newspaper read-
ership, volunteering, and blood donations. See Paola Bordandini and Roberto Cartocci, “Quante
Italie: Il Ritorno al Tradizionale Cleavage Tra Nord e Sud del Paese,” Cambio 8 (2014): 47–65.
Additionally, Joan Barceló presents evidence that supports Putnam et al.’s theory, suggesting a
long history of civic community in the historical republics of Italy, while ruling out possible in-
tervening variables that might have significantly influenced certain connections, such as the link
between the Communist Party of Italy and civicness. See Joan Barceló, “Re-Examining a Modern
Classic: Does Putnam’s Making Democracy Work Suffer From Spuriousness?,” Modern Italy 19
(2014): 457–71.
5. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1963), 30–32.
6. Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work (see note 4 above).
7. Silvana Patriarca, Italian Vices: Nation and Character From the Risorgimento to the Re-
public (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 5.
8. Gerry Mackie, “Patterns of Social Trust in Western Europe and Their Genesis,” in Trust
in Society, ed. Karen Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 245–82. Italian’s percep-
tion of one another varies across regions. See Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work (see note 4
above); Guido Tabellini, “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Eu-
rope,” Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010): 677–716.
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72 | Divided Nationothers.”9 On the other hand, “bridging” social capital draws individuals together
regardless of socioeconomic status, race, or ethnic background.10 Ethical behavior
in a “bonding” society is confined to the immediate family and closest friends.
Taxes therefore can be perceived as hurting the family by imposing a cost in order
to benefit people outside the familial unit.
Nevertheless, Putnam’s and Banfield’s works have been met by a litany of critics
who suggest that Putnam’s selection of data is problematic. Furthermore, they argue
that civic life was not completely absent in the South, and that progressive politics in
the North and the process of state building drove asymmetric economic performance
and governance.11 Salvatore Lupo, renowned for his work on the Southern question,
claims that Putnam et al. purposely select data points and variables that confirm their
theory while disregarding those that might contradict their premise.12 Sidney Tarrow
contends that Putnam et al. oversimplify regional definitions by joining Northern
regions with both long and short republican histories into one variable.13 Further-
more, Paolo Farneti unveiled evidence that revealed Puglia and Sicily as having
had the second and third highest percent of union membership in Italy in 1914.14
This would suggest that civic life was actually thriving in the beginning of the twen-
tieth century in Southern Italy. Tarrow also points out that Southern Italy in the
1980s and 1990s experienced major growth in civic associations and the formation
of civic culture, while the North was rife with corruption scandals. Carlo Triglia, for
example, found a total of 6,400 associations in the South, formedmostly after 1980.15
Moreover, the social capital literature often confounds explanations with out-
comes, which implies that public institutions and the elites that govern those in-9. Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital and the Global Economy,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 5
(1995): 89–103 at 91.
10. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
(New York: Simon and Schuster: 2001), 22–24.
11. Margaret Levi, “Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Mak-
ing Democracy Work,” Politics & Society 24 (1996): 45–55; Sidney Tarrow, “Making Social Sci-
ence Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam’s Making Democ-
racy Work,” American Political Science Review 90 (June 1996): 389–97; Filippo Sabetti, Search
for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2000).
12. Salvatore Lupo, “Usi e Abusi del Passato: Le Radici dell’Italia di Putnam,”Meridiana no. 18
(1993): 151–68.
13. Tarrow, “Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time” (see note 11 above).
14. Paolo Farneti, Sistema Politico e Società Civile: Saggi di Teoria e Ricerca Politica, vol. 25
of Pubblicazioni dell’Istituto di scienze politiche dell’Università di Torino (Turin, Italy: Giap-
pichelli, 1971), 291.
15. Carlo Trigilia, Cultura e Sviluppo. L’associazionismo nel Mezzogiorno (Rome: Donzelli,
1995).
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John D’Attoma | 73stitutions are somehow responsible for fostering a civic citizenry. For example,
Levi suggests that a government’s ability to protect property rights and a merit-
based society (one opposed to the clientelism or nepotism found in southern Italy)
instill a generalized trust in society.16 Even Putnam mentions that the regimes prior
to unification intensified distrust and vertical ties in the South, but he barely
mentions how unification reduced the South to “semi-colonial status,” and “its
fragile commercial sector brutally merged with the North’s more flourishing
economy, a uniform tax system and customs union imposed on its vulnerable in-
dustries, and brigandage rooted out by a full-scale military campaign.”17 Finally,
Filippo Sabetti contends that the growth of institutions and ecclesial infrastruc-
ture since the eighteenth century better explain the Italian political economy than
the “amoral familism” stressed by Putnam.18
Like these critics, I contend that the moralist argument fails to account for the
institutional environment (such as a period of progressive politics, political compe-
tition, or strife between the Church and the state) from which behavior may man-
ifest. While the vast majority of these scholars analyze the gap in economic and
social development, I am concerned with why taxpayer behavior differs so greatly.
Simply put, tax behavior reflects the quality of and perceptions about the govern-
ment institutions to which a taxpayer is contributing. There is ample evidence in
the literature suggesting that individuals are more likely to pay taxes if they believe
that the government is spending their tax money honestly and efficiently.1916. Levi, “Social and Unsocial Capital (see note 11 above).
17. Tarrow, “Making Democracy Work Across Space and Time,” 394 (see note 11 above).
18. Sabetti, Search for Good Government (see note 11 above).
19. Ronald G. Cummings et al., “Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence From Sur-
veys and an Artefactual Field Experiment,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70
(2009): 447–57; Jonas Edlund, “Trust in Government and Welfare Regimes: Attitudes to Redis-
tribution and Financial Cheating in the USA and Norway,” European Journal of Political Re-
search 35 (1999): 341–70; Bruno Frey and Lars Feld, “Deterrence and Morale in Taxation:
An Empirical Analysis,” (CESifo Working Paper Number 760, 2002); Bruno Frey and Benno
Torgler, “Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation,” Journal of Comparative Economics 35
(2007): 136–59; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1989); Margaret Levi, Audrey Sacks, and Tom Tyler, “Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring
Legitimating Beliefs,” American Behavioral Scientist 53 (2009): 354–75; Werner Pommerehne,
Albert Hart, and Bruno Frey, “Tax Morale, Tax Evasion and the Choice of Policy Instruments in
Different Political Systems,” Public Finance 49 (1994): 52–69; John Scholz and Mark Lubell,
“Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action,” American Journal
of Political Science 42 (1998): 398–417; Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness (Washington,
D.C.: American Bar Foundation, 1990); Kent Smith and Loretta Stalans, “Encouraging Tax
Compliance with Positive Incentives: A Conceptual Framework and Research Directions,”
This content downloaded from 192.167.090.139 on March 01, 2017 05:14:08 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
74 | Divided NationTaxation mobilizes citizens to demand accountability from their government;
conversely, a lack of government accountability can motivate individuals to evade
their responsibilities.20 In many ways, taxation is the linchpin binding govern-
ment accountability to citizen responsibility. Paying taxes is a form of indirect
political participation, which, in theory, should make government more answer-
able to taxpayers. To better illustrate this link, data from Bordandini and
Cartocci, Charron et al., and Bruno Chairini and Elisabetta Marzano are presented
in Figures 2a-2c;21 they suggest a clear correlation between quality of government,
voter participation, and generalized trust on the x-axis, and the percent of irreg-
ular work (underground labor), provided as a proxy for tax evasion, in each Italian
region, on the y-axis.22 I use voter participation as a proxy for trust in government.
In each case, the relationship is sorted along the North-South cleavage line, with
the South demonstrating less trust, lower levels of voter participation, and lower
quality of government, all of which are negatively correlated with percent of un-
derground employment. Indeed, data from a number of scholars suggest a clear
correlation in Italy between tax evasion (as measured by underground labor)
and measures of government accountability.23 Southern regions have higher levels
of underground labor and lower levels of trust, voter participation, and quality of
government.
According to Michael L. Ross, “Both the size of the tax burden, and the quality
and quantity of government spending matter; citizens ultimately care about the20. Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012);
Laura Paler, “Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives
to Restrain Government,” American Political Science Review 107 (2013): 706–25.
21. Bordandini and Cartocci, “Quante Italie?” (see note 4 above); Chiarini and Marzano,
“Structural and Cyclical Patterns” (see note 3 above); Nicholas Charron, Lewis Dijkstra, and
Victor Lapuente, “Mapping the Regional Divide in Europe: A Measure for Assessing Quality
of Government in 206 European regions,” Social Indicators Research 122 (2015): 315–46.
22. Santoro, L’Evasione Fiscale (see note 2 above). It is worth noting that both Liguria and
Abruzzo do not conform to the expected North-South pattern. The Southern region of Abruzzo
performs just slightly worse on the Quality of Government Index (see Table 2 below) than the
Northern region of Liguria, but the percentage of self-employed in Liguria is approximately one
percent higher, according to the National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT); see http://noi-italia
.istat.it. The combination of lower than average quality of government and a high rate of self-
employed individuals in Liguria could explain this unexpected result. In addition, the Northern
regions of Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche all have higher rates of self-employed individuals than
Abruzzo.
23. Bordandini and Cartocci, “Quante Italie?” (see note 4 above); Chiarini and Marzano,
“Structural and Cyclical Patterns” (see note 3 above); Nicholas Charron et al., “Mapping the
Regional Divide in Europe” (see note 21 above).
Law & Policy 13 (1991): 35–53; Benno Torgler and Friedrich G. Schneider, “Shadow Economy,
Tax Morale, Governance and Institutional Quality,” SSRN Electronic Journal (2007).
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John D’Attoma | 75‘price’ they pay for the government services they receive.”24 It is no wonder that
tax evasion is so rampant in Southern Italy. Italy as a whole consistently ranks
near the bottom on the Quality of Government index25 compared to other Euro-
pean nations, while the South ranks considerably lower than the North (see Ta-
bles 1 and 2). Furthermore, Italy’s 44% tax burden (ratio of tax revenue to GDP)Figure 2a. Irregular Work over Quality of Government
Key: X 5 South; • 5 North
Sources: Charron, et al., “Mapping the Regional Divide in Europe” (see note 21 in text above);
Borandini and Cartocci, “Quante Italia?” (see note 4 in the text above); Chiarini and Marzano,
“Structural and Cyclical Patterns” (see note 3 in text above).24. Michael L Ross, “Does Taxation Lead to Representation?” British Journal of Political Sci-
ence 34 (April 1, 2004): 229–49, at 234.
25. This index is based on 450 variables with the unit of observation being region of the
European Union. There were 251 regions included in the Quality of Government EU regional
index. Italy is made up of 12 regions in the North and 8 in the South. The mean QoG index in
the South is 21.58 and 2.0.25 in the North. A difference of means, two-tailed t-test is signif-
icant at the .001 level.
The Quality of Government standard index, developed at the Quality of Government Insti-
tute at Gothenburg University, is a based on a set of nationally representative public opinion
surveys of over 85,000 participants conducted about perceptions of local education, health,
and law enforcement institutions. Researchers asked participants to rate each of the three insti-
tutions on quality, impartiality, and corruption. For more information see Jan Teorell et al.,
“The Quality of Government Dataset,” The Quality of Government Institute (Gothenborg, Swe-
den, University of Gothenborg, 2011).
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Figure 2b. Irregular Work over Voter Participation
Key: X 5 South; • 5 North
Sources: See sources for Figure 2a.
Figure 2c. Irregularity of Work over Generalized Trust
Key: X 5 South; • 5 North
Sources: See sources for Figure 2a.
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John D’Attoma | 77is one of the highest in the European Union; only Denmark, Belgium, France, and
Sweden have a higher tax burden.26 Because confidence in public institutions (i.e.,
the state and political parties) is a direct reflection of the quality of those institu-
tions, if my view is correct, then Southern Italians should have less trust in their
public institutions. Consequently, Southern Italians should be more likely to evade
taxes.
In the next section, I outline the historical institutionalist approach. I employ
this approach to argue that unique institutional circumstances—such as loyalty to
the newly developed nation state in the North and to the Church in the South,
and political competition between political parties in the North and a vast polit-
ical monopoly in the South—have shaped a more positive perception of govern-
ment among Northern Italians compared to their Southern neighbors, generating
greater tax compliance in the North. In the historical analysis that follows, I then
trace the ways in which unification pitted the Church against the state and the
North against the South, providing a different experience with the state in the two
regions and hence different preferences regarding taxation. I argue that the Cath-
olic Church and the state after unification shaped two distinct attitudes towardsTable 1. Quality of Government Index in 14 Western European Countries
Country Quality Impartiality Corruption Average
Finland 1.657 1.296 1.266 1.406
Netherlands 0.956 1.445 0.912 1.104
Denmark 0.723 1.004 1.560 1.096
Ireland 0.705 1.046 1.252 1.001
United Kingdom 0.507 0.797 0.871 0.725
Sweden 20.030 1.128 0.897 0.665
Belgium 1.440 20.229 0.054 0.422
Germany 0.265 0.322 0.651 0.413
Austria 0.320 0.133 0.359 0.270
Italy 0.187 0.187 20.634 20.087
Spain 0.083 20.229 20.115 20.087
France 0.210 20.758 0.074 20.158
Portugal 20.259 20.848 20.745 20.617
Greece 21.287 20.655 21.304 21.08226. European Commis
Union (Luxemberg: Europ
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78 | Divided Nationthe state in Northern and Southern Italy, and thus, two different compliance en-
vironments. In the North, the high tax compliance environment was reinforced by
a type of clientelism that emerged from strong political competition between the
Christian Democrats, the Italian Socialist Party, and the Italian Communist Party.
These parties provided resources to unions for public works projects in order to
gain support of the large industrial base, which increased trust in public institu-
tions. In the South, however, the low tax compliance environment was hardened
by a form of clientelism driven by the Christian Democrats’ political monopoly,
which favored individualized, private goods instead of public goods, decreasing
trust in public institutions and hence decreasing tax compliance. In sum, because
Northerners have perceived their institutions as efficient and effective, they have
been more likely to contribute to the state through taxation. In contrast, Southern-
ers have perceived the state as inefficient and ineffective, leading them to circum-
vent their fiscal obligations.Table 2. Quality of Government Index for Italian Regions
Region
European Quality of
Government Index Region Score
2013 Rank
(among 236 European regions)
Trento 1.043 1.981 41
Valle d’Aosta 0.653 1.603 82
Friuli-Venezia 0.373 1.331 109
Veneto 20.186 0.788 146
Emilia-Romagna 0.217 0.757 149
Umbria 20.495 0.488 168
Toscana 20.533 0.450 170
Marche 20.535 0.448 172
Lombardia 20.542 0.442 174
Piemonte 20.652 0.335 182
Liguria 20.848 0.144 190
Abruzzo 21.097 20.097 200
Sardegna 21.307 20.302 204
Basilicata 21.423 20.414 208
Lazio 21.512 20.500 211
Sicilia 21.588 20.575 213
Puglia 21.604 20.590 216
Molise 21.6609 20.645 220
Calabria 21.687 20.671 222
Campania 22.242 21.210 232This c
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John D’Attoma | 79The Historical-Institutionalist Approach
The past is never dead. It’s not even past.27
Historical institutionalists strive to answer “big” questions, such as variation
between tax systems or welfare regimes among countries. The approach often
employs the comparative sequential method, defined as the “systemic compari-
son of two or more historical sequences.”28 Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) and Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dic-
tatorship and Democracy (1966) are classic examples of the comparative sequen-
tial method.29 Historical institutionalists often analyze a small number of cases
and focus on rich descriptive data that emphasize the role of institutions in struc-
turing behavior.30 Historical institutionalism need not always be cross-national
in scope, but comparison—be it cross-national or national—provides a tool for
demonstrating how specific political events and decisions are construed and
structured. Comparative historical institutional analysis is well suited for studying
the interaction between institutions and policy choices. It can help explain not
only the causal relationship between X and Y, but also the mechanisms through
which X affects Y. Historical institutionalist analysis is also quite adept at explain-
ing political events and circumstances within a small set of countries or polities
(internal validity), although it tends to lack generalizability or external validity.
When making small-N comparisons using historical institutionalism, the circum-
stances are context dependent and unique to the specific institutional environ-
ment within a particular country, thus one would have to make a large leap to
generalize their results to a larger set of countries. Finally, the robustness of this27. William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun (New York: Vintage, 2011), 23.
28. James Mahoney and Tulia G. Falleti, “The Comparative Sequential Method,” in Advances
in Comparative-Historical Analysis, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 211–39, at 211.
29. Other studies using the comparative sequential method include Sven Steinmo, Taxation
and Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996); Sven Steinmo and Caroline J.
Tolbert, “Do Institutions Really Matter? Taxation in Industrialized Democracies,” Comparative
Political Studies 31 (1998): 165–87; Peter J Katzenstein, Beyond Power and Plenty (Madison,
Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1997): 369–404; Theda Skocpol
and Paul Pierson, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” in Political
Science: State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W.W. Nor-
ton, 2002), 693–721.
30. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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80 | Divided Nationtype of approach stems from its reliance on “macroconfigurational explanations,
its emphasis on deep case-based research, and its attention to process and the tem-
poral dimensions of politics.”31 Historical case study research can provide expla-
nations for how and why certain outcomes and interactions unfold, given a spe-
cific context and timing. This is significant for furnishing causal explanations for
large-scale social phenomena such as the foundation of the welfare state.
Italy is an excellent setting for analyzing how divergent behavioral paths fol-
low from institutional differences within a single territory and a unitary political
system. In the following sections, I provide a causal explanation of the institu-
tional settings in which these divergent taxpayer behaviors were formed, beginning
with Italian unification in the nineteenth century and finishing with the start of the
Second Republic in the 1990s. The reasons for choosing to begin with unification
are threefold. First, beginning with unification, rather than with thirteenth-century
Italy, allows for a more thorough and deeper analysis of the development of the
links among events, institutions, and behavior. Second, unification—the first major
institutional punctuation in modern Italian history—had significant structural and
economic consequences for the South, and hence important behavioral implica-
tions. Finally, unification provided a uniform tax and political system across Italy
for the first time, and thus sets the stage for North-South comparisons.
Church-State Relations since the Risorgimento
In this section, I argue that the often conflictual relationship between the Catho-
lic Church and the state, as well as how that conflict unfolded in Northern and
Southern Italy, defined two separate attitudes regarding political unification, and
hence toward the state. While Southerners perceived the Catholic Church as a
source of protection against foreign occupying forces from theNorth, Liberal Dem-
ocrats who favored the national state expropriated a disproportionate amount of
taxes from the South to fund public investment in the North. This led Southern
individuals to seek ways to avoid paying taxes that they saw as illegitimate.32 By
contrast, Northern citizens were more likely to pay taxes, since the state would
spend that money in ways that benefited them.31. Ibid., 28.
32. Denis Mack Smith, Modern Italy: A Political History (Ann Arbor: University of Mich-
igan Press, 1997) 81; Nick Carter, Modern Italy in Historical Perspective (London: A&C Black,
2010), 211.
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John D’Attoma | 81The unique position of the Church, geographically and historically, has influ-
enced political processes and citizens’ attitudes towards taxation, as well as their
confidence in public institutions, by providing moral authority on political and
social issues. Indeed, for Catholics the relationship between the Italian state and
Vatican City, a recognized independent state surrounded by Italy, creates a con-
flict between loyalty to the state and devotion to the Church. The Risorgimento
(Resurgence), a period of political consolidation in Italy from 1815–1871 that cul-
minated in national unification, led to several papal documents that intensified the
conflict between the Church and the state. Unification ushered in a new form of
civic duty which demanded loyalty to a nation-state that embraced political and
economic liberalism, challenging the Church’s monopoly on institutional obedience.
Pope Pius IX’s 1864 Syllabus of Errors and Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 Rerum Novarum
both reflect the assumption that the Church was the center of societal prosperity
and private and social life. The two documents were as political as they were doc-
trinal. The Syllabus of Errors presented the Vatican’s rejection of liberal democratic
principles and, therefore, of the newly unified Italy. The book rejects the notion
that the Pontiff should uphold freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free-
dom of religion, and forbids Catholics from subscribing to them.33 Pope Leo XIII
legitimized the avoidance of unfair taxes in the Rerum Novarum and in his dis-
cussion of fair wages:
The right to possess private property is derived from nature, not from man;
and the State has the right to control its use in the interests of the public
good alone, but by no means to absorb it altogether. The State would there-
fore be unjust and cruel if under the name of taxation it were to deprive the
private owner of more than is fair.34
While this clash between church and state played out throughout Europe and
significantly influenced individual attitudes and behavior regarding taxation,35 it
was most evident in Italy, the home of both the Holy See and reformers deter-
mined to unify a divided nation. For a half century the Vatican posed the greatest
obstacle to a unified Italy, and this generated a tremendous amount of cognitive33. Ibid.
34. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, Encyclical Letter on the Condition of Labor, 1891, at
article 47.
35. Sven Steinmo, The Fiscal Foundations of the State: Taxation in Europe and America (un-
der contract with Oxford University Press).
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82 | Divided Nationdissonance among the Italian people. Although his temporal power was greatly
reduced, the Pope sought to assert influence through spiritual decree. In what
was considered to be one of the most controversial aspects of his papacy, between
1861 and 1869, Pius IX declared himself infallible, denounced the newly unified
state as incompatible with Catholicism and, with its policy of non expedit (“it is
not expedient”), declared that any political participation—be it holding public
office or voting—was an unacceptable form of support for the illegitimate state.
Since most Southerners were illiterate and hence ineligible to vote anyway, this pol-
icy did not drive them away from the Church. Moreover, although the Church’s
policy did not prohibit tax paying, it did help citizens rationalize not paying taxes
to the state.
In 1870, the Italian army first conquered Rome, the center of the Papal states,
generating greatly varied attitudes between North and South. Southerners saw the
Church as not only a barrier between them and Northern occupation, but also as
a guarantee of semi-autonomy. Although there was a large anti-clerical movement
in the North, the relationship between Catholicism and citizens was considerably
different in the South. Sabetti describes the clerical system in Southern Italy as far
less hierarchical than that in the North.36 Southern dioceses had more limited re-
sources and fewer parishes than their Northern and Central counterparts.37
Southern Italians therefore viewed the Church as a more democratic institu-
tion than, in the words of Sabetti, the “rapacious landlords, tax collectors, con-
scription officers and police officials” of secular civil society.38 Saunders describes
the spirit of the South “as a form of practical wisdom, a fountain of energy for
social transformation, a domain of autarky and of resistance to domination, but
also as ignorant superstition, debilitating fatalism and futility, a source of social di-
visiveness, and anarchism.”39 All of this suggests a climate of self-sufficiency in the
South despite political unification.
State land reclamation largely displaced the Church in Southern Italy, increas-
ing Southern disaffection towards the state. In fact, by 1880 over a million acres
of ecclesiastical lands had been dispossessed by the state and sold.40 The disestab-
lishment of Church lands led to private individuals, usually wealthy land owners,
exploiting the collective for private gain, which led to a large expansion of a me-36. Sabetti, Search for Good Government, 231–32 (see note 11 above).
37. John Pollard, Catholicism in Modern Italy: Religion, Society and Politics Since 1861,
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 11.
38. Sabetti, Search for Good Government, 232 (see note 11 above).
39. Ibid., 185.
40. Smith, Modern Italy, 82 (see note 32 above).
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John D’Attoma | 83diatory class known as the mafia.41 The mafia was even known to extract taxes
from priests for saying mass.42
Unification thus greatly structured the relationship between citizens, church,
and state, producing two separate tax compliance environments. In the South,
where the state was absent except as tax collector, citizens turned away from
the state and towards the Church, generating a low-compliance environment.43
But in the North, where literacy rates were high and many had the right to vote,
non-expedit drove citizens away from the Church and made them more likely to
support the state through higher tax compliance.
In addition, the South paid a disproportionally high amount of taxes; it made
up only 27% of GDP, but 32% of the tax base, while the North generated 48% of
the national wealth and paid only 40% of the nation’s taxes.44 Due to a much larger
agricultural base in the South, higher taxes on grain disproportionally affected the
South, while the North benefited the most from public spending. In addition, since
bread was a staple of the Southern Italian diet, increased taxes on grain also hit
Southern peasants the hardest.45 As Clark notes, the state imposed an unprece-
dented tax burden in the South at the time of unification, which funded the de-
velopment of the North.46 The North’s political dominance meant that it con-
trolled decisions about taxation and public spending, which favored citizens in
the North and extracted important resources through taxation from the South, ex-
acerbating the North-South economic divide. Between 1862 and 1897, 455 million
lire were spent on landfills in Northern and Central Italy, while only 3 million
were spent on such resources in the South. The majority of school and railway
spending was also concentrated in the North.47 Development in the South certainly41. James Walston, The Mafia and Clientelism: Roads to Rome in Post-War Calabria (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1988).
42. Smith, Modern Italy, 213 (see note 32 above).
43. For an explanation of different compliance environments see Marcelo Bergman, Tax
Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America: The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance
in Argentina and Chile (State College: Pa.: Pennsylvania State Press, 2010).
44. Smith, Modern Italy (see note 32 above).
45. Carter, Modern Italy (see note 32 above).
46. Martin Clark, Modern Italy 1871–1995 (New York: Longman, 1996), 24. However, Car-
ter argues that the evidence does not support claims of exploitation and high taxation on South-
erners at the turn of century; see Carter, Modern Italy, 50 (see note 32 above). Most accounts
agree with Clark; see, for example, Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks of
Antonio Gramsci, ed. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and Quintin Hoare (New York: International
Publishers, 1971), 70–71, 94; Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Ha-
ven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), 21–26.
47. Martin Clark, Modern Italy, 25 (see note 46 above).
This content downloaded from 192.167.090.139 on March 01, 2017 05:14:08 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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newly formed state. See Figure 3 for an illustration of the rapid decline in Southern
per capita income as a percent of Northern per capita income after the Risorgi-
mento. These differences in economic development, investment, and taxation led
to a sense of unfairness and distrust in the South, and hence to less willingness
to pay taxes.48
In sum, the relationship between Italy’s most important institutions, the Cath-
olic Church and the State, put the newly unified country on two different trajec-
tories that shaped the Northern and Southern Italian experience with the state
and their public institutions. The North expropriated a disproportionate amount
of taxes from South and used the money to fund its own public investments, pro-
moting uneven development in Italy and a deep distrust in the state among
Southerners. Because the state lacked the political will to govern and redistribute
goods efficiently in the South, citizens were more likely to pursue other means ofFigure 3. GDP Per Capita in the South as a Percent of Northern GDP Per Capita
Note: The vertical line demarks unification.
Source: L. Bianchi, et al. “150 Anni di Crescita, 150 di Divari: Sviluppo, Trasformazioni, Politiche,”
Rivista Economica del Mezzogiorno 3 (2011): 449–516.48. James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein, “Tax Compliance,” Journal of
Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818–60.
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financial favors to the Southern elite or public employment and benefits to indi-
viduals, as we will see in the following sections. By contrast, Northern citizens
were more likely to pay taxes because they believed the state would spend their
money efficiently.
The Italian People’s Party, the Italian Socialist Party
and the Rise of Fascism
The turn of the century brought rising fears of socialism throughout Europe.
Hence, the Catholic Church and right-wing liberals joined forces in the North,
where there was a strong industrial labor base, to organize mass political engage-
ment in direct competition with the socialists. Catholic, right-wing, and socialist
organizations made conscious efforts to build effective and efficient public insti-
tutions in order to garner support for their political movements; these institutions
promoted a high-compliance environment. On the other hand, the South, made
up of mainly peasants, lacked any kind of industrial base and became disengaged
with civic and associational life, leading to a low-compliance environment.
Although Putnam describes a long history of associational behavior (civicness)
in the North, dating back to the republican governments of the Middle Ages, the
Catholic Church after the turn of the century made a conscious effort to build
civic associations as an alternative to a Socialist workers’ movement. This played
an important role in driving civic consciousness and institutional development in
Northern and Central Italy in the years immediately after World War I. By con-
trast, the lack of any significant industrial labor force in the South hampered po-
litical competition and inhibited the formation of efficient public institutions or
a civic oriented populace. Tarrow argues that at the time of unification, “so in-
grained was the clientele system that the mass of new voters, most of them rural
and all of them dependent economically on the political elite, were easily inte-
grated into the existing system.”49 In other words, rather than having a political
choice, poor Southern peasants became dependent on their clientelistic relation-
ships with local elites. The provision of individualized goods from patrons to cli-
ents inhibited the foundation of a civically oriented populace.
The rise of a Catholic political party (the Italian People’s Party, Partito
Popolare Italiano) after 1914 marked the beginning of Catholic mainstreaming
in Italian politics and challenged the dominance of the ruling party in the North.49. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, 168–69 (see note 46 above).
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South in the early twentieth century, support for the Italian People’s Party came
mainly from the Northern regions of Italy. Pope Benedict XV, Pope Pius’s suc-
cessor, immediately reversed his predecessor’s anti-modernization policies, such
as banning Catholic trade unionism, while improving the Church’s relationship
with the Italian government and the Italian people. While anti-Italian stigma had
been attached to the Catholic Church since the Risorgimento, Italian-Catholic
politicians and the patriotism of the Catholic clergy during the war changed
the prevailing feelings about Catholicism in Italy,50 which bitterly divided the old
ruling class and paved the way for outside parties such as the People’s Party
and the Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano). These two parties took a com-
bined total of more than half of the legislative seats in the election of 1919. Only
in the South did the “old government” parties (Liberal Democrats, Partito Lib-
erale Democratico) win more than half the votes. This was largely the result of
the practice of trasformismo, in which ruling parties won over the opposition
party in return for political, and often financial, favors. The old guard liberals, es-
pecially in the South, made use of public resources for both individual and polit-
ical gain.51
Political strife in Italy only further divided the North and South along party
lines. As a result of this election, 146 of 156 of the Socialist deputies came from
the North and Center; 76 of the 100 People’s Party deputies were also from
the North; and 162 of the 239 deputies from the Liberal Party and the Radical
Party, who had previously dominated the parliament, were elected in the South.
Although the 1919 election resulted in the first “Radical” government led by
Francesco Nitti, political turmoil between the Radicals, Socialists, and Fascists
led to Nitti’s resignation and the return of the Liberal Democrat Giolitti as prime
minister in 1920. When elections were called again in 1921, the Giolitti govern-
ment’s hegemony was tenuous. To solidify his control, he made certain conces-
sions to the Fascists, including adding them to the government’s party list. The
disparate governing coalition Giolitti put together was doomed from the outset,
and resulted in his immediate resignation, to be followed by a string of short-
lived prime ministers and the eventual rise of Fascist leader Benito Mussolini.
In sum, the early twentieth century in Italy was marked by deep divisions be-
tween the Church and the state, among political parties, and between the North50. Pollard, Catholicism in Modern Italy (see note 37 above).
51. Walston, The Mafia and Clientelism, 49 (see note 41 above).
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competed for the burgeoning industrial labor movement in the North by provid-
ing and building effective public services and institutions. The South, on the other
hand, was ruled by the old ruling partly (Liberals), who enjoyed a large monopoly
on political power. By providing public jobs and financial favors to the landed
elite through trasformismo, the ruling party maintained its hegemony in the South,
marginalizing Southern citizens from the political process.
The Fascist Period (1922–1943)
The Fascist period can be characterized by two main approaches to building ef-
fective administrative capabilities and public services across Italy: an attempt to
modernize the tax system with a series of uniform tax reforms, and a series of
pubic investments that had the unintended effect of increasing the North-South
economic cleavage. To dampen some of the more negative consequences of the
administration’s policies, the government funneled money through quasi-state
organizations, strengthening clientelism in the South. This hardened the low-
compliance environment in the South.
Tax reform during the Fascist period involved three separate methods. The
first, liberal tax reform in the early Fascist period (1922–25), provided preferen-
tial tax treatment to productive industries with the misguided expectation that
these industries would then comply with existing tax law. After this reform failed,
Mussolini shifted to an authoritarian model, where he would stigmatize and pe-
nalize evaders. He declared tax evaders “the worst parasites in the nation” and
increased tax enforcement between 1926 and 1929, while introducing tax verifi-
cation agents and criminalizing tax evasion.52 However, the corporatist economic
model and increased foreign commitments, such as the Italian-Ethiopian War in
the 1930s, which diverted administrative resources, led him to restrain the more
authoritarian aspects of the administration’s tax policy, which demanded a large
amount of administrative oversight. This led the administration back to the more
liberal, cooperative model enforced during the 1922–25 period, especially with re-
spect to businesses.
Although tax and administration reform are important aspects of any success-
ful attempt to increase tax compliance, Mussolini’s complete disregard for the
South exacerbated the economic divisions between the North and South and52. Stefano Manestra, “A Short History of Tax Compliance in Italy,” Bank of Italy Occasional
Paper 81 (2010), at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1825982.
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tries and disproportional public investment generate a feeling of unfairness and
distrust in the economic system, both of which reinforce the low-compliance en-
vironment.53 Mussolini’s industrial policy accentuated economic divisions be-
tween the North and the South by concentrating economic development in en-
gineering, steelmaking, chemicals, and hydro-electricity supply—all industries
located in the industrial triangle of the Northwest. Almost half of industrial work-
ers and two-thirds of engineers worked in Lombardy, Liguria, and Piedmont,
while the majority of workers from the South were farmers and artisans.54 The
government also increased the extent of the welfare state in the Fascist period,
making Northern industrial workers eligible for generous benefits not available
to Southern workers—an imbalance that continues to this day. Because of the
North’s large industrial base, unionized workers were able to lobby for and win
larger pensions than the average Southern Italian peasant. This contributed to pa-
tronage and clientelistic practices as a means of income supplementation in the
South; clients directly exchanged their votes for public employment and favorable
tax treatment.55
Moreover, Mussolini’s push to project Italy as an international power had ad-
verse consequences for the Southern economy. Mussolini implemented a revalu-
ation of the lira in 1926 to project Italy’s position, which reduced wages and sharply
increased unemployment, largely in the agricultural South. In the late 1920s
through the early 1930s, Mussolini increased tariffs on wheat, which amounted
to a large concession to landowners, who gained the most from the government
policies, whereas Southern peasants were hit the hardest.56 To lessen the damage in
the South, the administration funneled jobs through parastato, quasi-governmental
agencies which dealt with health, welfare, and pensions, which then became the
most important criterion for resource distribution.57
Fascism only enlarged the economic and social disparity between the North
and the South, resulting in completely different encounters with the state in the
two regions. The Northern experience was shaped by public investment and effi-
cient public institutions. Indeed, Fascism was born and maintained in the North,53. Andreoni et al., “Tax Compliance” (see note 48 above).
54. Clark, Modern Italy 1971–1995 (see note 46 above).
55. Maurizio Ferrera, “The ‘Southern Model’ of Welfare in Social Europe,” Journal of Eu-
ropean Social Policy 6 (February 1996): 17–37.
56. Peter Neville, Mussolini (New York: Routledge, 2014); Clark, Modern Italy 1971–1995
(see note 50 above).
57. Walston, The Mafia and Clientelism (see note 41 above).
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for the state increased due to the state’s general neglect of that region.
From the First Republic to the Second Republic (1946–1994)
The period after World War II brought great, but asymmetric, prosperity in Italy.
Just as during the previous period, political competition among the Christian
Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists (Partito Communista Italiano)
led to major public works and investment in Northern Italy, while the Christian
Democrats’ political monopoly intensified clientelistic networks. Although the
central government invested heavily in the South beginning in 1950 with a Fund
for the South (the Cassa per il mezzogiorno), the implementation of the fund was
greatly affected by clientelism. In 1970, regional governments were implemented,
further exacerbating the underlying issues in the South. Regional governments
were granted more autonomy and discretion in the distribution of resources, es-
pecially financial resources, which they then could funnel to private interests.
While clientelism became stronger in the South as a result, one of the largest cor-
ruption scandals in Italian history unfolded in the North. Widespread distrust in
the governing parties hence brought down the government and led to the Second
Republic.
After World War II, Italian citizens were polarized both economically and
ideologically. In the 1944–46 period, Sicilian farmers organized to secede from
the North, which led to a June 2, 1946, popular vote pitting the Italian dynasty
(the Monarchy ruled by Humbert II of Savoy) against the Republic. The North,
led by the Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats, favored the Repub-
lic; the majority of the South voted to uphold the dynasty.59 In 1946 tensions be-
tween the Communists and the Christian Democrats presented another challenge
to national unity: while the Communist Party was closely tied to the Soviets, aid
and investment from the U.S. government and U.S. firms influenced the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Alcide De Gasperi government.
Italian policy after the war had to address funding public investment for a
newly developed country. The new Republic therefore implemented broad tax re-
form on January 11, 1951, under the control of Finance Minister Enzio Vanoni.
The law had four major provisions: 1) annual tax returns required of all tax-58. John Pollard, The Fascist Experience in Italy (London: Routledge, 2005).
59. Ibid.; See also David Gilmour, The Pursuit of Italy: a History of a Land, Its Regions, and
Their Peoples (New York: Macmillan, 2011).
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90 | Divided Nationpayers, both employees and self-employed; 2) greater progressivity combined
with lower income taxes overall; 3) a series of consumption taxes; and 4) business
taxes on items such as stamps and licensing.60 Unfortunately, subsequent admin-
istrations lacked the administrative capacity to continue through with Vanoni’s
reforms, and tax compliance remained low. The new tax code was particularly
susceptible to favoritism, especially among high-income earners as well as specific
Christian Democratic voting blocs in the South. In addition to tax reform, the
government invested in the Northern industrial triangle, while continuing to
leave the South economically behind.61 The 1950s marked the beginning of ap-
proximately two decades of great prosperity in Northern Italy. As it became
one of the most industrial regions in Europe, greatly benefiting from the European
Community, the Marshall Plan loans, and an influx of cheap Southern labor,
the South remained impoverished. Data provided by Clark depict Southern Italy
in the 1950s as similar to many underdeveloped countries.62 The disparities be-
tween the North and the South were so considerable and evident that the state in-
stituted the Fund for the South—a rural spending agency providing roads, housing,
and water to rural areas.
Established in 1950, the Fund’s original strategy related primarily to agri-
cultural production, but by 1957 it had been transformed to favor the relatively
capital-intensive steel, chemical, and petrochemicals industries, while perpetuat-
ing a mass patronage system in the South. It increased unemployment among
Southerners by shifting investment from the agricultural periphery to the urban
coastlands and importing highly skilled workers from the North to the South.63
And although Amintore Fanfani, De Gasperi’s successor, hoped to replace the
deeply embedded clientele system with a new form of organized politics in the
South, none of his state intervention plans disrupted the clientele system.64 Ac-
cording to Chubb, the Fund became “a political bandwagon for the maintenance
of local clienteles.”65 Tarrow disparages both the Fund and the National Hydro-
carbons Agency, calling them “far from revolutionary . . . mainly a program of
mass patronage, which could gather votes for the party from all groups and60. Christina Amrosetti, Ezio Vanoni e la Riforma Tributaria in Italia, SIEP Working Paper
325 (Pavia, Italy: Università de Pavia, 2004).
61. Clark, Modern Italy 1871–1995, 349 (see note 46 above).
62. Ibid., 357.
63. Judith Chubb, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1982).
64. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (see note 46 above).
65. Chubb, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy, 32 (see note 63 above).
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John D’Attoma | 91shades of opinion in the South.”66 In Calabria, from 1950 to 1976, all the directors
of the Fund’s main office were Christian Democrats.67 According to Duggan,
these bureaucrats considered the public sector to be a tool to garner partisan po-
litical support, instead of a means to develop the South or to foster what he calls
an “ethical model of citizenship.”68
This form of clientelism in the South stymied citizen cooperation. Mario
Caciagli argues that clientelism is a cultural phenomenon and a unique form
of political culture defined by reciprocity and deference.69 The resilience and path
dependency of institutions contributed to the tenacity of clientelism in the South-
ern Italian political system.70 An inefficient and asymmetric economic structure
reinforced a clientelist system that directly supported the individual interest in
income supplementation, while disregarding the public interest. Caciagli argues
that “in the conditions of the South, clientelism remained the principal factor
in inhibiting a culture of social cooperation and collective action.” In other words,
clientelism secures lasting political power, but fails to build a civic consciousness
or an active civil society.71
Moreover, clientelism increased the size of the inefficient bureaucracy in the
South, while distributing financial favors to local businesses. In the early 1950s,
the South, with only 38% of the population, accounted for 45% of all public em-
ployees. This number increased to 63% by 1963, overwhelmingly driven by clien-
telistic practices between the Christian Democrats and important interest groups.72
Although staffing the public bureaucracy was one feature of their clientelistic net-
work, Warner writes: “The [Christian Democrats’] clientelist system grew not so66. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, 313 (see note 46 above).
67. Carolyn M. Warner, “Mass Parties and Clientelism: France and Italy,” in Clientelism,
Interests, and Democratic Representation, ed. Simona Piattoni (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 122–51.
68. Christopher Duggan, The Force of Destiny: a History of Italy Since 1796 (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 56–63.
69. Mario Caciagli, “The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy,” in Comparing Political
Corruption and Clientelism, ed. Junichi Kuwata (Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.,
2006), 157–70.
70. Sven Stienmo, “Historical Institutionalism,” In Approaches and Methodologies in the So-
cial Sciences, ed. Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2008): 118–138; Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the
Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251–67.
71. Caciagli, “The Long Life of Clientelism” (see note 69 above).
72. Warner, “Mass Parties and Clientelism,” 130 (see note 67 above). Calculations are from
data provided in Pasquale Saraceno, “La Disoccupazione Italiana e’ Dovuta a Ragioni Strut-
turali,” in L’Economia Italiana, ed. Augosto Graziana (Milan, Italy: Mulino, 1972), 100–103.
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ing the financial largesse of which the state agencies were in possession, and from
bureaucratic problem solving on behalf of individual constituents.”73
Clientelism is not a homogenous phenomenon; rather, it acclimates to a spe-
cific political and economic environment. On the one hand, in the South, where
resources were extremely scarce and interest groups were not visible, the Chris-
tian Democratic political machine dealt with individual constituents by promis-
ing universal benefits and resource distribution. Local elites in the South had little
interest in developing the Southern economy, as they benefitted greatly from their
networks. The low tax compliance environment in the South was perpetuated by
those clientelistic networks. Patrons could represent their clients through the dis-
tribution of tax favors or by their willingness to turn a blind eye to tax evasion.74
The state, which deferred much of its administrative responsibilities, such as tax
collection, to local notables, demanded very little from its citizens.75
Although clientelism took on a particularly detrimental form in the South,
funneling jobs and public resources to individual clients, in the North clientelism
evolved in a way that actually increased public investment and citizen engage-
ment. In the North, where interest groups such as Catholic Action and the Com-
munist Party were firmly rooted in the political ecosystem, the Christian Demo-
crats had to appeal to local leaders with specific benefits, usually in the form of
public works. Unlike in the South, active political competition between the Com-
munists and the Christian Democrats for a politically powerful industrial base
forced the parties to provide public works effectively, while at the same time en-
couraging active political participation. The state and civil society (labor unions)
worked hand-in-hand to develop the North’s economy. In fact, Tarrow contends
that it was the pro-labor actors in the North, such as the Christian Democrats
and Catholic Action as well as the Communist and Socialist parties, that guaran-
teed the “defense of democracy and of social development” and that deliberately
established civic associations, and hence good governance.76 In the South, hierarchi-
cal links were more common between the political and landed elites and peasants,
while in the North, the state and civil society (mainly unions) worked cooperatively
to invest in large scale public works projects, as well as in industrial firms.73. Ibid., at 141.
74. Duggan, The Force of Destiny (see note 68 above).
75. Jonathan Hopkin and Alfio Mastropaolo, “From Patronage to Clientelism: Comparing
the Italian and Spanish Experiences,” in Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation,
ed. Piattoni, 152–71, at 155 (see note 67 above).
76. Tarrow, “Making Social Science Work” (see note 11 above).
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goods efficiently, citizens will often pursue other means of redistribution, includ-
ing the more individualized form of clientelism found in the South.77 By contrast,
citizens are more likely to pay taxes if they believe their tax money is being spent
efficiently.78 For Southerners, the government, beginning with unification, was in-
efficient and taxation was relatively high. Thus, clientelism provided a vehicle to
sidestep the inefficiencies of the state and avoid high taxation. The Christian
Democrats’ clientelistic political strategy guaranteed its national political domi-
nance for nearly 40 years. Even in the most Northern areas—where the Commu-
nist Party maintained a great deal of strength—the Christian Democrats’ use of
clientelistic politics in the form of business regulations and lax tax enforcement
broadened its support.79
When the governing coalition incorporated the Socialist Party in 1963, the
Italian welfare system moved in an ambitious direction, unintentionally bolster-
ing clientelistic ties, especially in the South. A massive amount of state funds was
invested in the South, largely fueling its existing clientistic networks and increas-
ing the scope of clientelism by providing more benefits to more citizens in the
South. Between the mid-1950s and the beginning of the 1970s, welfare became
the largest central government expenditure, reaching 38% by the mid-1970s.80
Welfare spending became a tool by which patrons could distribute benefits di-
rectly to individuals (individual-level clientelism),81 such as the approval of un-
employment benefits, through the welfare state to a vast network of clients, in
exchange for individual votes. This type of clientelism is particularly prevalent77. Valeria Fargion, “Social Assistance and the North-South Cleavage in Italy,” in Southern
European Welfare States, ed. Martin Rhodes (London: Routledge, 1997), 135–54; Bergman, Tax
Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America (see note 43 above); Hopkin and Mastropaolo,
“From Patronage to Clientelism” (see note 75 above).
78. Cummings et al., “Tax Morale”; Edlund, “Trust in Government and Welfare Regimes”;
Frey and Feld, “Deterrence and Morale in Taxation”; Frey and Torgler, “Tax Morale and Con-
ditional Cooperation”; Levi, Of Rule and Revenue; Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey, “Tax Morale,
Tax Evasion”; Scholz and Lubell, “Trust and Taxpaying” Smith and Stalans, “Encouraging Tax
Compliance”; Torgler, Benno and Schneider, “Shadow Economy” (see note 19 above for all of
these sources). See also Kent Smith, “Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Com-
pliance,” in Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement, ed. Joel Slemroad (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 223–50.
79. Hopkin and Mastropaolo, “From Patronage to Clientelism” (see note 75 above).
80. Maurizio Ferrera, “Italy,” in Growth to Limits: ed. Peter Flora (New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 1986), 385–482.
81. This contrasts with categorical-level clientelism, in which benefits, such as public works
projects, are provided to the client (such as a union or professional organization) in return for
the collective votes of that organization’s members.
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94 | Divided Nationin economically disadvantaged areas, where resources (such as jobs) are particu-
larly scarce.82 From 1951 to 1976, the portion of the labor force employed by the
state doubled to 22%, which is a sign of both Italy’s bureaucratization and a dis-
tinctly Southern form of clientelism.83 Because these benefits were provided at the
individual level, clients would not associate benefits from patrons as a public
goods provision, which would then increase tax compliance, but rather as a pri-
vate good.
We can also examine the distribution of executive board positions on the so-
cial security funds by party identification in order to better understand the extent
of clientelism in the welfare system. Table 3 clearly shows that the mass patron-
age system favored the Christian Democrats more than other parties.
Clientelistic markets were reinforced when individuals from weak economic
sectors (small enterprises, services, and agriculture) sought out ways to supple-
ment their income as a result of Italy’s inequitable welfare system. Italy’s two-tier
welfare system distinguishes between a highly protected class of worker (mainly
industrial workers and public employees) and those in weak sector employmentTable 3. The Distribution of Executive Board Positions on the Social Security Fund
by Party, 1945–75
Political Parties 1945–47 1948–54 1955–62 1963–69 1970–75
Total
(1945–1975)
Christian Democrats (DC) 25.1 31.5 35.7 38.0 38.5 36.3
Italian Communist
Party (PCI) 8.7 5.3 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.3
Italian Democratic
Socialists (SDI) 6.4 6.5 7.1 5.3 4.7 5.8
Italian Socialist Party(PSI) 5.9 4.3 4.2 5.4 8.4 5.6
Italian Liberty Party (PLI) 5.0 7.2 4.1 3.5 2.3 4.0
Italian Social Movement
Party (neo-fascists) (MSI) 0.5 1.6 2.1 2.5 1.7 2.0
Not Identified 47.5 40.1 39.3 37.6 37.0 38.5
(N) (219) (2,019) (3,822) (4,028) (3,453) (13,541)82. Warner, “Mass Partie
83. Ibid., 395.
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John D’Attoma | 95(small enterprises, services, agriculture, and gray or black market jobs), who re-
ceive far fewer benefits. Although the South accounted for a disproportionate
number of public sector jobs, the majority of Southerners still worked in weak
sector employment throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As seen in the large regional
discrepancies in irregular employment (see Figure 4), the two-tier system bene-
fited Northern workers much more than their Southern counterparts. Southerners
supplemented their insufficient incomes by subverting the rules and regulations of
the welfare system as well as by evading taxes, and public administrators tolerated
and even encouraged them.84
In the 1960s, the government introduced a major public investment program
that helped to raise the standard of living throughout the South, but this period
also was characterized by a significant amount of political turmoil, which exacer-
bated citizens’ disaffection towards the state. By 1967, the Italian economy was
showing signs of crisis. The large-scale migration of unskilled Southern workers
had supplanted high-skill factory workers in the North, which led to major fac-
tory floor protests throughout Northern Italy. Then, factory workers in the SouthFigure 4. Differences in Underground Employment by Region
Note: The y-axis shows underground work as a percentage of total full-time equivalent work.
Source: Chiarini and Marzano, “Structural and Cyclical Patterns” (see note 3 in text above).84. Maurizio Ferrera, “The Uncertain Future of the Italian Welfare State,” West European
Politics 20 (December 1996): 231–49.
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96 | Divided Nationtook to the shop floors to demand better pensions, social security, housing, and
health services. By 1976, the trade union movement had become a major force in
Italian politics, representing nearly 50% of workers.85 Large pay raises, however,
increased overall labor costs in Italy to levels exceeding many European coun-
tries, and corporate profits suffered by the end of the decade.86 Both the extreme
right and left responded to the crisis with political terrorism, including assassina-
tions and kidnappings. The major political strife of the 1960s demanded a major
political response, and thus the government introduced regional governments
with increased autonomy, especially regarding the allocation of welfare spending,
in the spring of 1970. By the mid-1970s, Italy’s regional governments could pro-
vide subsidies, fund and staff welfare agencies, draw up regional development
plans, and organize their own cooperatives. However, as Clark writes, these re-
gional governments also fed the Calabrian Mafia (ndrangheta) and the Neapolitan
Mafia (camorra), with powerful interest groups supporting particularism rather
than creating more efficient, democratic institutions.87
Furthermore, in 1973 Finance Minister Luigi Preti introduced tax reforms that
aimed to meet the demands of a developed nation and address the burgeoning
public deficit. But despite his efforts, the tax system failed to address the under-
lying administrative or the structural problems, such as clientelism. The new taxes
included the establishment of a national progressive income tax, a corporate income
tax, a local income tax, a capital gains tax, and a value added tax.
In an attempt to crack down on tax evasion stemming from the large patron-
age system, the state reverted to the more authoritarian measures Mussolini had
used to enforce tax compliance. The state coordinated with provincial newspa-
pers throughout Italy to publish the names of 200,000 tax evaders between
1979 and 1981. Law 516/1982, called the “handcuffs for evaders,” elevated the
penalties for tax evasion and made indictment easier.88 However, these efforts
did little to reduce tax evasion. The courts found many of the provisions of
the handcuffs law to be unconstitutional, and only a small fraction of accused
transgressors were convicted under it. In addition, the courts became so over-
whelmed with cases that their only response was to offer tax amnesty.89 Tax am-
nesties actually lower compliance by demonstrating a lack of enforcement on the85. Clark, Modern Italy 1871–1995, 377 (see note 46 above).
86. Duggan, The Force of Destiny, 567 (see note 68 above).
87. Ibid., 392.
88. Santoro, L’Evasione Fiscale (see note 2 above).
89. Ibid., at Kindle location 951–52.
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John D’Attoma | 97part of the administration.90 The less punitive Law 154/1991 and Law 74/2000
replaced the handcuffs law. Income tax evasion actually increased from the time
of the implementation of the tax reform through 1978, decreased slightly from
1978 to 1981, and never fell below 33.7% in this period.91
Despite continuous attempts to fix the tax system, weak administrative capac-
ity and a patronage system entrenched in the political culture of both Northern
and Southern Italy ultimately produced tax evasion. In the North, clients were
collective actors such as unions and professional associations, who benefited from
mass public works projects in return for their members’ votes, while in the South,
the provision of welfare benefits, public sector jobs, and tax favors characterized
the clientelistic system. By the 1980s, the South had been greatly damaged by or-
ganized crime, and youth unemployment was nearly 50%. While Duggan notes
that the trappings of modern consumerism had come to the South, he credits
cash transfers through the social security system and “superfluous public sector
jobs.”92 In the North, on the other hand, the 1980s was a time of great prosperity.
Manufacturing and artisan production were booming, largely due to the state’s
willingness to overlook tax crimes.
In sum, the 1950s to 1980s brought an enormous increase in development in
the North, in some ways fueled by a form of clientelism that funneled resources
to efficient and effective public works projects, which in turn were the foundation
of a high tax compliance environment. On the other hand, the Christian Demo-
cratic political monopoly had little incentive to develop the South, as local polit-
ical elites were already profiting from an individualized form of clientelism that
prioritized personalized interests instead of the public good. This form of clientel-
ism reinforced a low tax compliance environment.Conclusion
The culturalist argument proposed by both Banfield and Putnam et al. fails to ac-
count for the institutional environment that structures individuals’ behavior. This
flaw in their theory of civic development in the South leads back to the complex-90. James Alm, Michael McKee, and William Beck, “Amazing Grace: Tax Amnesties and
Compliance,” National Tax Journal 43 (1990); 23–37; Andreoni et al., “Tax Compliance,”
854 (see note 48 above).
91. Stefano Manestra, A Short History of Tax Compliance in Italy (Rome: Banca d’Italia,
2010).
92. Duggan, Force of Destiny, 575 (see note 68 above).
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98 | Divided Nationities that this study has sought to address in order to explain tax evasion and com-
pliance. By constructing a historical landscape dating from unification to the fall
of the First Republic, I have identified several periods and institutions that have
influenced the relationship between state and citizen.
Unification had significant repercussions for the Catholic Church and the
newly unified state, defining two divergent patterns of taxpayer behavior. South-
ern citizens turned to the Church for protection from what they saw as Northern
colonizers during this period, while the North embraced calls from liberals for a
unified nation-state. The politically dominant North demanded disproportionate
revenues from the South to fund public works projects largely benefiting the
North, which, I argue, generated greater confidence in the state among Northern
Italians and hence a greater willingness to pay taxes. Meanwhile, relative incomes
in the South were reduced considerably compared to those in the North (see Fig-
ure 3 above); Southerners were exploited by the newly formed state and more
supportive of the Church, and thus were more likely to contribute to the Church
through the massa commune than to the state through taxation.
During the period directly following unification, from the turn of the nine-
teenth century to 1914, Northerners made industrial and economic gains while
the majority of Southerners remained peasants. This was partly due to the fact
that the Catholic Church largely disintegrated in the South, as the state sold off
Church lands to the wealthy landed elite. In addition, Catholic associations were
nonexistent after 1889, which left the South neglected politically and civically.
However, the death of Pope Pius X, coupled with the rise of socialist parties in
Europe, led to the rise of a Catholic workers movement in the North, where there
was a large industrial base. With the exception of a few labor unions in Puglia and
Sicily, the Catholic and socialist labor movements were mainly concentrated in the
North after 1914. Therefore, from the turn of the century until World War I, the
South was left neglected by the political class and the Church, and clientelism be-
came deeply ingrained in the Southern way of life. In the North, by contrast, po-
litical competition helped shape functioning public institutions and a thriving la-
bor movement.
Moreover, the first decade of the twentieth century was characterized by rel-
atively small periods of prosperity and long periods of instability; in this context,
the deep-seated social and economic cleavage between the North and South con-
tinued to shape two separate compliance environments. The advent of Fascism
only increased the political and economic divisions between the North and South.
Mussolini’s disdain for the South was reflected in industrial policies that concen-
trated economic development in the North, further increasing the economic di-This content downloaded from 192.167.090.139 on March 01, 2017 05:14:08 AM
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John D’Attoma | 99vide. As a form of income supplementation, clientelism became one of the only
means of distributing resources to the South.
After the fall of Fascism and the end of World War II, the rise of mass political
parties in the North and the Christian Democratic political monopoly in the
South deepened clientelistic networks and maintained the economic gap between
the North and South. Because there was active political competition and progres-
sive politics in the North, clientelism evolved in such a way that patrons provided
public works projects to unions, construction companies, and professional orga-
nizations in return for members’ votes, fostering functioning public institutions
and a politically active citizenry in the North. In contrast, the Christian Demo-
crats’ political monopoly in the South created a form of clientelism that provided
individualized benefits such as public employment to unqualified workers and tax
favors. Contrary to the “amoral familism” argument, this study demonstrates that
Italy’s most important formal and informal institutions were responsible for
shaping two distinct political and economic landscapes; both relied heavily on
clientelism to support their constituents, but because the North invested in high
quality public institutions, its residents are also more willing to invest in public
institutions through taxation.John D’Attoma is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the European University Institute,
where he currently works on the project “Willing to Pay: Testing Institutionalist
Theory with Experiments,” funded by the European Research Council. His re-
search uses causal inference to study taxation in Europe and the United States,
and he has recently begun preliminary analysis examining under what conditions
trust can emerge in the sharing economy. Ongoing and future research can be
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